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"Close" vs. "Strategic" Integration with the World Economy and the 
"Market-Friendly Approach to Development" vs. an "Industrial Policy":   
A Critique of the World Development Report 1991 and an Alternative 
Policy Perspective{PRIVATE } 
 I 
 As Mr. Barber Conable observes in his Foreword, the World Development Report 1991 "synthesises and 
interprets the lessons of forty years of development experience" (p. iii).  In view of the World Bank's leading role in 
development financing for poor countries around the globe over much of this period, this is clearly an important 
document.  The Report is necessarily being taken very seriously in policy making circles throughout the developing 
world.  It is therefore essential that there should be a full analysis of its intellectual approach and the evidence 
underlying its conclusions. 
 The starting point for the Report is the question:  why during the last four decades some developing 
countries have been successful in the sense of substantially raising their per capita incomes whilst other have not.  
The central analytical argument is that economic growth is determined essentially by the growth of total factor 
productivity of capital and labour.  The Report's analysis comes to the conclusion that the more open an economy, 
the greater the degree of competition and the higher its investment in education, the greater would be its growth of 
total factor productivity and hence its overall economic growth.  Although the significance of the international 
economic factors is recognised, a major argument of the Report is that domestic policy matters far more for raising 
per capita incomes than world economic conditions. 
 The centre-piece of the Report's policy conclusions is its recommendation of a so-called `market-friendly' 
approach to development.  The Report states:  "Economic theory and practical experience suggest that 
(government) interventions are likely to help provided they are market-friendly" (p. 5).  `Market-friendly', it is 
explained, means the following: 
 a.  Intervene reluctantly.  Let markets work unless it is demonstrably better to step in...  [I]t is usually a 
mistake for the state to carry out physical production, or to protect the domestic production of a good that 
can be imported more cheaply and whose local production offers few spillover benefits. 
 b.  Apply checks and balances.  Put interventions continually to the discipline of international and domestic 
markets. 
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 c.  Intervene openly.  Make interventions simple, transparent and subject to rules rather than official 
discretion.  
 The state's role in economic development in this market-friendly' approach is regarded as being important 
but best limited to providing the social, legal and, economic infrastructure and to creating a suitable climate for 
private enterprise.  The Report implicates other development economists in its policy recommendations by 
suggesting that there is now a growing consensus around the `market friendly approach' to development (p. 1). 
 II 
 I have a number of reservations about the Report's analysis and its conclusions.  However, it would be best 
to begin with  significant points of agreement.  I concur with the general methodological approach of examining 
the question why over the last four decades some countries were able to achieve high rates of economic growth and 
others not.  Secondly, I agree with the Report's generally optimistic outlook on the possibilities for development 
for the poor countries.  I also read the last forty years of development experience as indicating that these countries 
have an enormous potential for economic growth.  In principle, in right international economic circumstances, and 
with appropriate economic policies, these countries can in general achieve what may be called their `socially 
necessary' rates of economic growth.  The latter represent the rates of economic expansion which developing 
countries require to provide employment for their fast growing labour forces and to meet the minimum basic needs 
of their people for food, clothing, shelter, etc over a reasonable time span.  Such growth rates, which are estimated 
to be of the order of five to six percent per annum need not be out of reach of the developing countries.1  I also 
welcome the Report's recognition that there is no automatic trickle down of the fruits of economic progress in a 
market economy, and that it is therefore necessary for the governments to provide a 'safety net' for the most 
disadvantaged in society during the course of economic development.  Moreover, the Report's emphasis on the 
importance of the objective of establishing stable macroeconomic conditions in developing countries is also 
common ground. 
                                                 
    1See further Singh (1984, 1992a).  Taylor (1991). 
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 My principal reservations concerning the Report are summarised below.  These will be elaborated in the 
following sections. 
 1.  I have difficulty in accepting the Report's analysis of the relative importance of the international 
conditions and domestic policy in determining economic outcomes in developing countries.  The 
Report, in my view, does not give adequate recognition to the fact that during the 1980s the world 
economic forces had a far greater adverse impact on countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa relative to these in Asia; this was a main reason for the poor performance particularly of the 
Latin American countries during the last decade.  There are a number of important implications of 
this point which are ignored in the Report, thus leading to incorrect conclusions being drawn with 
respect to some of its centred themes. 
 2.  A fundamental argument of the Report is that the greater the degree of international economic 
integration (e.g. the larger the share of trade), the better it is for any particular economy or for the 
world economy as a whole.  A corollary of this view is that the less the distortions from 
international competitive prices in an economy, the greater would be its economic growth.  I am 
afraid I cannot accept these propositions either at a theoretical level or empirically. 
 3.  The intellectual foundation of the Report is the total factor productivity approach to economic 
growth.  The implicit  underlying paradigm here is that the more competitive the product, labour 
and capital markets in an economy, the more efficient will be the utilisation of resources, the faster 
will be its technical progress and hence economic growth.  In my view this paradigm is analytically 
flawed; it is also not as good at explaining empirical evidence as an alternative theoretical approach 
which does not regard greater market competition as an unalloyed good, and which gives a far 
bigger role to demand factors and to overall national and world economic growth, to account for 
changes in productivity growth. 
 4.  I find it particularly difficult to accept the Report's account of the economic history of the 
successful East Asian economies─Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  Nor am I at all comfortable 
 
 
  4 
with the Report's analysis of, and the lessons to be learnt from the experience of the `unsuccessful' 
countries. 
In addition to these analytical differences, I also find that there are important omissions from the Bank economists' 
examination of forty years of development experience (e.g. what lessons do the bank economists draw from the 
Bretton Wood institutions' own role in the international debt crisis of the 1980s?).  There are also a number of 
relatively minor points of disagreement─interpretations of the econometric evidence which is presented, places 
where even in its own terms the Report's conclusions do not follow from the data put forward.  These points will 
be referred to as appropriate in the course of the  analysis below. 
 In view of the above reservations, it is no surprise to say that I would arrive at very different policy 
conclusions from those contained in the Report. 
 III 
 I begin with the report's analysis of the development experience of the successful East Asian economies.  
The Report observes (pp. 13-14): 
Extraordinary progress is possible even when countries seem doomed to fail.  Forty-three years ago 
an influential government report in an important developing country observed that 
labour today shunned hard, productive jobs and sought easy, merchant-like work.  
The report showed that workers' productivity had fallen, wages were too high, and 
enterprises were inefficient and heavily subsidized.  The country had virtually priced 
itself out of international markets and faced a severe competitive threat from newly 
industrializing China and India.  It was overpopulated and becoming more so.  This 
would be the last opportunity, concluded the prime minister in July 1947, to discover 
whether his country would be able to stand on its own two feet or become a 
permanent burden for the rest of the world.  That country was Japan.  The central 
question of this Report is why countries like Japan have succeeded so spectacularly 
while other have failed. [Underlining added] 
 The Report is quite right to stress the case of Japan since the experience of that country in the period 
following the Second World War is highly relevant to the developing countries, particularly the large semi-industrial 
economies.  In the early 1950s, Japan produced less steel (about 5 million tons) and fewer cars (about 50,000) than 
countries like Brazil, India and Mexico do today and it was largely an exporter of labour-intensive products.  The 
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U.S. annual steel output at that time was about a hundred million tons and the American automobile industry 
produced around six million cars every year.  Yet less than two  decades later Japan was producing more steel, and 
by 1980 more cars than the U.S.  The Japanese workers, starting from Asian wage levels in the 1950s, were well on 
their way to reaching European standards of living twenty-five years later (Singh, 1989). 
 In analyzing this arguably the most spectacular case of successful industrial development in the history of 
mankind, the relevant question in the present context is to what extent, if any, the Japanese followed the Report's 
prescriptions and a `market-friendly' approach to development.  Did the Japanese government intervene in the 
markets `reluctantly':  did it for example leave the prices and production priorities to be determined mostly by 
market forces and simply provide the necessary infrastructure for private enterprise to flourish? How 'transparent' 
was the government intervention in Japanese industry? To achieve this colossal economic success, how closely did 
the Japanese economy integrate with the world economy?  The Report does acknowledge the inescapable fact that 
there was considerable government intervention in the course of post-War Japanese development.  The important 
issue, however, is whether the Report's characterisation of this intervention and the lessons to be drawn from it are 
valid. 
 There is overwhelming evidence and it is generally accepted among the scholars in the field that the 
government in Japan did not intervene in the markets `reluctantly'.  On the contrary, it pursued a forceful and 
aggressive industrial policy to change the unsatisfactory economic situation faced by that country--so eloquently 
described in the Report's paragraph quoted above.  The cornerstone of this industrial policy was the so-called 
`structural policy' aimed at adaptation and technological development of certain specific industries (steel, chemicals, 
machinery and other heavy industries) thought to be vital for the rapid growth of productivity and per capita 
incomes (Singh, 1979).  The role of the government in promoting these industries and hence bringing about 
Japanese economic success has been so crucial that, as the Japanese industrial economist Professor Nino (1975), 
remarked, "whereas [the] USA is said to be a country of [the] military industrial complex...in this sense, Japan may 
be called a country of the Government industrial complex." 
 At the end of World War II, the bulk of Japanese exports consisted of textiles and light manufactured 
goods.  In the view of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI], although such an economic 
structure may have conformed to the theory of comparative advantage (Japan being a labour-surplus economy at 
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the time), it was not viable in the long run.  It is worth quoting in full Vice-Minister Ojimi's rationale for the 
Ministry's industrial policy2: 
The MITI decided to establish in Japan industries which require intensive employment of capital 
and technology, industries that in consideration of comparative cost of production 
should be the most inappropriate for Japan, industries such as steel, oil-refining, 
petro-chemicals, automobiles, aircraft, industrial machinery of all sorts, and 
electronics, including electronic computers.  From a short-run, static viewpoint, 
encouragement of such industries would seem to conflict with economic rationalism. 
 But, from a long-range viewpoint, these are precisely the industries where income 
elasticity of demand is high, technological progress is rapid, and labour productivity 
rises fast.  It was clear that without  these industries it would be difficult to employ 
a population of 100 million and raise their standard of living to that of Europe and 
America with light industries alone; whether right or wrong, Japan had to have these 
heavy and chemical industries.  According to Napoleon and Clausewitz, the secret 
of a successful strategy is the concentration of fighting power on the main battle 
grounds; fortunately, owing to good luck and wisdom spawned by necessity, Japan 
has been able to concentrate its scant capital in strategic industries. 
 The government used a wide variety of instruments to bring about this extraordinary structural 
transformation of the Japanese economy between 1950-73, the period of its most rapid growth.  The most 
important of these were bank finance and directed credit, import controls and protection, restrictions on entry and 
exit of firms in the domestic market, control over foreign exchange and importation of foreign technology (Caves 
and Ukeusa, [1976]; Boltho, [1975]; Nino, [1975]; OECD, [1972], Dore [1986],Yamamura [1988]). 
 The significance of these policies, and particularly the economic rationale underlying them, will be 
considered further in the next two sections.  In the meantime we note that the Japanese government did not only 
use these methods of intervention to concentrate resources to promote specific industries, its role in the country's 
industrial development was deeper and even more intrusive.  It extended to the level of the individual firm:  MITI 
accorded favourable treatment in a variety of ways to the specific firms which were thought to best fulfil its aims 
and were therefore in its good books.  As for the `transparency' of this intervention, it was the exact opposite of 
the `market-friendly' specification.  Thus Professors Caves and Ukeusa [1976] on the operations of the Japanese 
industrial policy: 
                                                 
    2OECD (1972), quoted in Singh (1979, pp. 217-8). 
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Each sector of the Japanese economy has a cliental relation to a ministry or agency of the 
government.  The ministry, in addition to its various statutory  means of dealing 
with the economic sector;, holds a general implied administrative responsibility and 
authority that goes well beyond what is customary in the United States and other 
Western Countries.  While the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
plays the most prominent role, its operations are not distinctive.  "The industrial 
bureaus of MITI proliferate sectoral targets and plans; they confer, they tinker, they 
exhort.  This is the economics by admonition to a degree inconceivable in 
Washington or London.  Business makes few major decisions without consulting 
the appropriate governmental authority; the same is true in reverse." (p. 149; quotes 
in the original from Lockwood, 1965) 
 Moreover, as we shall see in Section IV, the Japanese government did not seek "close," but rather what may 
be called a "strategic" integration with the world economy.  For example, it made extensive use of formal or 
informal import controls and protection.  It also restricted foreign direct investment by multinationals.  These 
points will be taken up further when the concept of "strategic integration" is developed below. 
 III.l As several scholars have noted, the other East Asian tigers, notably South Korea and Taiwan, have also 
each followed a purposive and comprehensive industrial policy.  [See among others Chalmer Johnson, 1980; 
Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990].  These countries have been greatly influenced by the Japanese example and practice.  
In view of their relative backwardness compared with Japan, state intervention in these economies has been even 
more far-reaching than in Japan.  Very briefly, in the case of S. Korea, attention may be drawn to the following 
aspects of the country's industrial policy. 
i.  The use of long-term credit at negative real interest rates to foster particular industries. 
ii.  The "heavy" subsidization and the "coercion" of exports. 
iii.  The strict control over multi-national investment and foreign equity ownership of Korean industry. 
iv.  A highly active state technology policy. 
v.  State promotion of large scale conglomerate firms, government encouragement of mergers of specific 
corporations, and in general state restrictions on the free entry and exit of firms. 
Table 1 summarises the industrial policy instruments used in the development of core Korean industries (as well as 
textiles) in the late 1960's and 1970's. 
 
 
  8 
 Table 1.  The Chief Provisions of Industrial Promotional Laws in Korea 
 
{PRIVATE }Major Content Machi-
nery 
Ship- 
building 
Electro- 
nics 
Petro- 
chemical 
Iron & 
Steel 
Non- 
ferrous 
metal 
Textile 
(year of enactment) (1967) (1967)  (1969 ) (1970) (1970) (1971) (1979) 
REGULATIONS 
Entry Restriction 
Capacity Regulations 
  Setting up Facility 
   Standard 
  Capacity Expansion 
   Approval 
  Incentives to use  
   Domestically Produced 
   Facilities 
Production Regulation 
  Regulation of Material 
   Imports 
  Production Standard 
   and its Inspection 
  Restrictions on 
   Technology Imports 
Price Control 
Reporting and Inspection 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 x 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
RATIONALISATION 
  Rationalisation Programmes 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 x 
   
 x 
R&D SUPPORT 
  Subsidies to R&D 
  Joint R&D Projects 
 
 x 
  
  
 x 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 x 
  
FINANICIAL SUPPORT 
Special Purpose Fund 
Financial Assistance 
 Subsidies 
  Direct Subsidy 
  Reduced Public Utility 
   Rates 
Tax Preferences 
  Special Depreciation 
  Tax Reduction/Exemption 
 
 x 
 x 
  
 x 
 x 
 
 
 x 
 x 
 
 x 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 x 
  
  
 x 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 x 
  
 x 
 
 
 
 x 
 x 
 
 x 
 x 
  
SPECIAL INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX 
 x   x  x    x 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
ASSISTANCE 
  Facilitating Overseas 
   Activities 
  Purchase of Raw Materials 
 
 
 
  
 
 x 
  
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
PRODUCERS' 
ASSOCIATION 
 x  x  x      x 
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  Source:  Reproduced from Chang (1992), p. 153.    
 
 Similarly, for Taiwan, Wade [1990] documents the widespread and intensive use of state industrial policy to 
purposefully guide the market economy.  It is certainly not a picture of some nightwatchman state intervening 
"reluctantly".  Until the early 1980s, both S. Korea and Taiwan had nationalised banks (and most of their banks are still 
state-owned), and in both countries, state-directed credit to favoured sectors and firms was an important device for 
planned industrial development.  Moreover, the authors of the Report overlook the fact that the public enterprise sector 
in Taiwan is one of the largest among the developing mixed economies.  It is bigger than India's or that of Argentina, 
Brazil or Mexico.  The public enterprises have contributed 13-14% of GNP and a third of gross fixed capital formation 
in Taiwan throughout the years 1950 to 1975, a period which witnessed the most rapid economic and industrial growth in 
that country (Chang and Singh, 1992; Short, 1984).  Wade observes that: 
In many sectors public enterprises have been used as the chosen instrument for a big push.  This is true 
for the early years of fuels, chemicals, mining, metals,  fertilizer, and food processing; 
but even in sectors where public enterprises did not dominate, such as textiles and 
plastics, the state aggressively led private producers in the early years.  Later, during the 
late 1950s and 1960s, public enterprises accounted for a large part of total investment in 
synthetic fibers, metals, shipbuilding, and other industries...To say that public enterprises 
have often played a central role in creating new capacities is not to say that private firms 
have been left alone.  Incentives and pressure are brought to bear on them through such 
devices as import controls and tariffs, entry requirements, domestic content 
requirements, fiscal investment incentives, and concessional credit.  Even in the case of 
machine tools, a small-scale industry relatively neglected until recently, the state 
nevertheless has provided subsidized design help, subsidized credit, and quantitative 
import restrictions.  And large-scale private firms are often exposed to more 
discretionary government influence, taking the form of what in Japan is called 
"administrative guidance" (p. 110-11). 
 In view of the useful and important role played by public enterprises in Taiwan as well as in Korea, the Report's 
blanket admonition to the states in developing countries not to engage in `direct production'--not to produce steel and 
cement (p. 31)--would appear to be misconceived.  The reference to steel is particularly inappropriate since Posco, the 
Korean state-owned steel company, is the most efficient steel producer in the world.  In 1986, Posco produced 467 tons 
of crude steel per person compared with an average of 327 tons for Japan's five biggest steel producers.  The company's 
efficiency advantage is passed on to its Korean customers.  It charged domestic steel consumers $320 per ton--far less 
than American or Japanese car makers who (according to Posco) paid $540 and $430, respectively (The Economist, 21 
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May 1988; for a more detailed discussion of Posco's efficiency advantage over other steel producers, see Amsden, 1989, 
pp. 298-99). 
 III.2 To sum up, between them, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan did all the things which the `market-friendly' 
approach to development is not supposed to do.  Above all, all three countries followed an `industrial strategy'--a set of 
policies to  deliberately change the vector of prices and incentives facing the producers--which is explicitly ruled out by 
this approach.  The Report acknowledges that there was heavy state intervention in all these three countries but argues 
that `these economies refute the case for thorough going dirigisms as convincingly as they refute the case for laissez-faire' 
(p. 5).  The experience of these countries is certainly an argument against laissez-faire; it also does not provide any 
support for "command" planning of production of the Soviet-type,which in effect supplants the market altogether.  
However, for mixed-economy developing countries with strong states, it is unequivocally an argument for adopting an 
industrial strategy, for guiding the market, and not following a hands-off `market-friendly' approach as enunciated in the 
Report.  Moreover, as mentioned in the case of Japan, it will be suggested below that the experience of all three East 
Asian countries is an argument against seeking `close integration' with the world economy; rather it is an argument for 
choosing `strategic integration' with the latter.  These concepts of "guiding" the market and of "strategic integration with 
the international economy" will become clearer when we discuss the role of domestic and international competition in 
these economies in the following sections. 
 Other neoclassical accounts, not just the WDR, also have a difficult task in accommodating the facts of pervasive 
interventions of the East Asian states in their internal and external economies, with the theoretical and policy framework 
used in such analyses.  Some have even argued that these countries would have grown faster still if the state had not 
intervened in these economies (Lal, 1983).  Others have suggested that in countries like Korea, the state has followed a 
`prescriptive' rather than a `proscriptive' policy and that accounts for the success of state intervention in that economy.  
Still others have suggested that the essential reason for the state's success in these countries is that it has followed the 
market rather than leading or guiding it.  Such arguments have been carefully analyzed by Wade, Amsden, Chang (1992) 
and others and found to have very little merit. 
 What does distinguish the industrial policy of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from that of many other countries, 
both developed and developing, is the ability of the state in the former countries to use not only `carrots' (incentives, 
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subsidies, etc.) but also `sticks' (punishments) to influence firm behaviour.  In that sense, the state in these countries has 
been much more powerful and has, what the political scientists call, greater 'autonomy' than in many other economies.  
(See further Fishlow, 1991a; Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989). 
 IV 
 We turn now to the central analytical argument of the Report, the total factor productivity approach to economic 
growth.  It is suggested that inter-country and inter-temporal variations in growth rates are caused by variations in total 
factor productivity of capital and labor.  Changes in the latter variable are thought to be determined mainly by economic 
policy--the degree of openness of an economy, the extent of competition in the product and factor markets, and 
investment in physical and human capital (education), particularly the latter.  The underlying chain of causation is that 
competition and education promote technical progress, and therefore total factor productivity growth and hence economic 
expansion.  "Free mobility of people, capital, and technology" and "free entry and exit of firms" are regarded as being 
particularly conducive to the spread of knowledge and technical change. 
 The role of "openness" and international competition, as well as domestic competition, as critical determinants of 
productivity growth is repeatedly stressed throughout the Report (See chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8).  In relation to domestic 
competition, the Report notes:  "...systems of industrial licensing, restrictions on entry and  exit, inappropriate legal 
codes concerning bankruptcy and employment, inadequate property rights, and price controls--all of which weaken the 
forces of competition--have held back technological change and the growth of productivity." [p. 7] In the analysis below, 
I shall concentrate mainly on the Report's arguments with respect to the role of competition.  Questions of external 
competition, "openness" and "the integration of countries with the global economy" will be examined in the following 
section (V), and those relating to domestic competition in the product, labor, and financial markets in Section VI.  In 
addition to an analysis of the role of competition , there are, however, two other issues which deserve comment.  These 
will be taken up below in the rest of this section. 
     IV.l The first point concerns the Report's underlying causal model and the total factor productivity (TFP) approach 
to economic growth.  At a theoretical level, there are several well-known objections to this type of analysis.  The model 
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assumes for example full employment of resources and perfect competition, none of which obtain in the real world.  
Moreover, it is a wholly supply-side model which ignores altogether the role of demand factors.
3
 
 Further, even a cursory consideration of the empirical evidence presented by the Report itself reveals the serious 
limitations of the TFP approach.  Table 2.2 on page 43 provides figures for total factor productivity growth, separately 
for each developing region and for each of the two sub-periods 1960-73 and 1973-87.  The table shows that in every 
region, except South Asia, the rate of growth of total factor productivity fell substantially in the second sub-period, 
compared with the first.  In terms of the analysis of the Report, this would be due to policy mismanagement--low rates of 
technical progress caused by distortions, lack of competition, lack of integration with the world economy, etc.  The 
evidence, however, is not compatible with such an analysis,  since as the Report itself notes elsewhere there has actually 
been more competition, greater integration of the world economy, less distortions in most developing countries in the 
later period (particularly in the 1980s) than in the former.
4
 
 These facts are much more in accord with an alternative theoretical paradigm which would suggest that the fall in 
the world and the national economic growth rates in the post-1973 period was responsible for the decline in the rate of 
growth of productivity in most regions (Verdroon's Law).
5
  The decline in world economic growth after 1973, in terms of 
this paradigm, was due to a lower rate of growth of world and national demand caused by a whole range of factors (e.g. 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the growth of real wages in a number of industrial countries outstripping 
productivity growth in the wake of the first oil shock) connected with the fall of the Golden Age of development of the 
OECD economies.
6
 
 It is a serious shortcoming of the Report that it does not even consider this alternative causal model, let alone 
systematically test it against empirical evidence.  Without such an examination of the data in terms of competing causal 
hypotheses emanating from these two paradigms─both of which have well established pedigrees in the subject--the 
                                                 
    3There is an enormous literature on the subject.  For a lucid analysis of the relevant issues under discussion here, see Nelson [1982]. 
    4See also Singh [1989,1990] on this point. 
    5The classic references here are Verdoorn (1949) and Kaldor (1966). 
    6The period 1950-73, when the OECD economy grew at an unprecedented rate of almost 5% per annum─twice its historic trend rate of 
growth─has been termed by my colleagues Andrew Glyn, Alan Hughes, Alain Lipietz and I the Golden Age of capitalism.  [Glyn, Hughes, 
Lipietz and Singh, 1990].  This essay provides a detailed analysis of why the Golden Age rose in the first place and why it fell following the 
1973 oil shock.  See also Maddison [1982]; Bruno and Sachs [1985]. 
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Report's policy conclusions are unconvincing.  Regrettably, the failure to consider different causal explanations of the 
data is commonplace in the Report, leading often to misleading and erroneous policy conclusions.  Some further 
examples of this will be provided below and in the following sections. 
     IV.2 Secondly, with respect to the Report's analysis of the relationship between education and economic growth, I 
briefly note here that the Report's empirical results, based on a cross section study of sixty countries over the period 
1965-87, suggest that a "three-year-higher initial level of education is  associated with an increase of 0.4 per cent in the 
annual growth rate."  Although the Report correctly observes that such correlations do not imply causation, it 
nevertheless goes on to draw the conclusion that:  "Both better policies and more education contribute to growth.  
Furthermore, they seem to interact.  Thus, the effect on growth of better policy and more education together is greater 
than that of each separately (Table 2.4).  Similar results are obtained for changes in education and for investment" (p. 
46). 
 Such policy conclusions are unfortunately misleading.  To illustrate, the poor economic performance of the Latin 
American countries during the "lost decade" of the 1980s can hardly be ascribed to a deficit in education.  It will be 
difficult to argue that education, let alone primary or secondary education as the Report's overall analysis of this issue 
suggests, is a constraint on economic growth of these countries; or that expanding such education will significantly 
increase economic growth on this developing continent.  Even for African countries, where the Report's policy 
conclusions in this area may be regarded as being more applicable, a detailed investigation is required to show that it is 
the lack of primary or secondary education, rather than other factors (e.g., world economic conditions or for instance 
deficiencies in university education) that has been a major factor responsible for slow economic growth in these countries 
during the last decade.  The Report does not provide such an analysis.  Any policy conclusion that expansion of primary 
education will increase economic growth in the medium term or for that matter during the rest of this decade, even for the 
African countries, is therefore hazardous. 
 The above examples suggest two basic flaws in the Report's analysis and policy conclusions with respect to the 
role of education.  One, the Report implicitly assumes that there will be full employment of resources--that those who 
are educated will find appropriate employment.  Two, here, as indeed at a number of other places, the Report's empirical 
conclusions are based on cross section regression analyses of countries from different continents and over time periods 
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which, from an economic point of view, it may be inappropriate to aggregate .  This point will be taken up further in 
Section VII where the differential impact of world economic conditions on countries in different developing continents, 
particularly Asia and Latin America in the 1980s is explored. 
 The Report is of course right to note that "progress in education is to be sought mainly as an end in itself" (p. 56). 
 However, for the reasons outlined in the previous paragraphs, it's general policy conclusion that education will promote 
economic growth is unlikely to be valid for many developing countries in the next five to ten years. 
 V 
 The Report's assertions with respect to the role of openness, external competition and closer integration with the 
world economy do not stand up to serious examination either at a theoretical level or empirically, particularly in terms of 
the experience of the East Asian countries it holds up as models of successful development.  In the discussion below, I 
shall first comment on the empirical evidence presented by the Report itself to support its contention of an important 
positive relationship between these variables.  Next, I shall provide information bearing on these issues for the East 
Asian economies.  It was suggested earlier [Section III] that these countries had sought a "strategic" but not a "close" 
integration with the global economy--i.e., they integrated up to the point where it was useful for them to do so for 
promoting national economic growth.  I shall put forward an alternative theoretical paradigm with respect to the 
relationship between openness, international economic integration, and economic growth.  This will help to provide an 
analytical rationale for the "strategic integration" path pursued by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
 The Report's own empirical analysis of the relationship between trade openness, "distortions" from international 
prices, and productivity growth is presented in Chapter 5.  This evidence (see Figure 5.3 on p. 100 and Table note 5.3 in 
the technical Appendix, p. 163), even in its own terms is extremely weak.  Notwithstanding countless permutations of 
the indicators used to denote distortions and openness, only 12 of the 37 regression coefficients reported in Table note 5.3 
are statistically significant at the 5% level.  The R2's range between 0.03 and 0.3.  The interpretation of the econometric 
results on page 164 is less than exemplary:  it is implied, for instance, that it makes no difference to the verification of 
the economic hypotheses under discussion whether one considers "levels" of or "changes" in the values of some of the 
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independent variables.  The tentative character of this empirical evidence are acknowledged in the text of Chapter 5 but, 
despite that, far-reaching and firm policy conclusions are drawn from it in the Report's overview chapter.
7
 
 With respect to the nature and extent of "openness" practiced by the East Asian economies, I provide here some 
relevant data on Japan.  Table 2 gives comparative figures on imports of manufacturers into Japan and other industrial 
countries between 1961 and 1978.  During this period, as a proportion of GDP, Japanese imports rose by 66 percent.  
This compares with a threefold increase in the corresponding U.S. imports, more than tripling of the U.K. imports and a 
nearly 250 percent growth in the imports of other European Economic Community countries.  In 1978, manufactured 
imports constituted only 2.4 percent of the  Japanese GDP; the corresponding proportion in Britain and other countries 
of the EEC was five to six times larger.  Even in the United States which traditionally, because of its continental size, 
has a relatively closed economy, the volume of imported manufacturing goods in the late 1970s was proportionally 
almost twice as large as in Japan.  Clearly, during the 1960s and 1970s (and even more so in the 1950s) the Japanese 
economy operated under a regime of draconian import controls, whether practised formally or informally. 
Table 2.  Import-Penetration in Manufactures in Advanced Industrial Countries, 1961-1978 (ratio of manufactured 
imports to GNP) 
{PRIVATE }  1961  1965  1969  1973  1979 
U.S.A. 1.5 2.1 3.4 4.0 4.5 
U.K. 4.6 6.7 8.0 11.7 14.2 
Rest of EEC 9 6.1 7.6 10.1 13.0 15.8 
Japan 1.8 1.5 2.2 3.0 2.4 
   Source:  CEPG (1979). 
 
 
     With respect to the questions of overvalued exchange rates and distortions, the Japanese Government maintained 
exchange controls and kept a steady nominal exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar over almost the whole of the 
period of that country's most rapid growth (1950-73).  Purchasing power parity calculations by Sachs (1987), using 
                                                 
    7In relation to other empirical studies on this subject, the Report states in the text on p.98:  "Most of the studies which have analysed 
GDP growth and openness to trade have found a positive relation (Box 5.3)." [Underlining added].  However, when one turns to Box 5.3, 
the conclusion is much more tentative.  We are told:  "The majority of the evidence now available shows a positive relation between 
openness--however measured--and growth" [p.99, Underlining added].  For the record, I note here that other recent surveys of the 
empirical evidence on this issue by independent scholars [see Pack, 1988; Roderik, 1991] are even more skeptical about a positive 
relationship between openness and economic growth. 
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Japanese and U.S. price indices, show a 60 percent real appreciation of the exchange rate between 1950 and 1970.  As 
for close integration with the international capital markets and foreign direct investment, Sachs notes that domestic 
capital markets were highly regulated and completely shut off from the world capital markets for most of this period.  
Only the government and its agencies were able to borrow from and lend abroad.  Foreign direct investment was strictly 
controlled.  Foreign firms were prohibited, either by legal or administrative means, from acquiring a majority ownership 
in Japanese corporations. 
 To appreciate how the Japanese policy of protection worked at a microeconomic level, consider the specific case 
of the celebrated Japanese car industry.  Magaziner and Hout (1980) point out that "government intervention in this 
industry was characterized by three major goals:  discouragement of foreign capital in the Japanese industry and 
protection against car imports, attempts to bring about rationalization of production, and assistance with overseas 
marketing and distribution expenditure" (p. 55).  They point out that the government imposed comprehensive import 
controls and adopted a variety of measures to discourage foreign investment in the car industry.  Quotas and tarriffs were 
used to protect the industry; the former were applied throughout the mid-1960s, and prohibitively high tarriffs till the 
mid-1970s.  Moreover, "the government controlled all foreign licensing agreements.  To make technology agreements 
more attractive to the licensor, it guaranteed the remittance of royalties from Japan.  The policy stipulated, however, that 
continued remittances would be guaranteed only if 90 percent of the licensed parts were produced in Japan within five 
years"--about as powerful a domestic content arrangement as you can get. 
 The Report acknowledges that the Japanese protected their industry (as did Taiwan and Korea) but it is silent on 
the question of restrictions on foreign direct investment and government controls over foreign capital inflows for 
industrial development.  Even with respect to protection, the Report does not tell you how large and pervasive its use in 
effect was in a country like Japan.  In general, the Report is embarrassed by the East Asian protection; its overall tone is 
to suggest that it is a miracle that these economies did as well as they did despite the protection. 
 There is little recognition of the fact that protection has played an extremely important, positive role in promoting 
technical change, productivity growth and exports in a country like Japan.  Protection provided the Japanese companies 
with a captive home market leading to high profits which enabled the firms to undertake higher rates of investment, to 
learn by doing and to improve the quality of their products.  These profits in the protected internal market, which were 
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further enhanced by  restrictions on domestic competition (see Section VI), not only made possible higher rates of 
investment but also greatly aided exports.  Yamamura (1988) explains the mechanism involved: 
Because increased output meant reduced cost per unit it translated into increased profits on the product 
sold at high fixed prices in the domestic market, even if the increased output had to be 
exported at no profit or even at a loss. . . .  Manufacturers enjoyed a margin of error 
when making . . . major investment decisions.  Essentially, even in the face of the high 
probability that the increase in output would have to be sold unprofitably on the 
international market the expansion was still worth the risk.  The stronger the "home 
market cushion"─or the more effective the cartels and protection on the domestic 
arena─the smaller the risk and more likely the Japanese competitor was to increase 
capacity boldly in anticipation of demand growth.  This can give the firm a strategic as 
well as a cost advantage over a foreign competitor operating in a different environment 
who must be more cautious (page 177). 
     The Report echoes the view of some neoclassical analysts who suggest that although the governments in East Asian 
countries imposed protection, they were careful "to offset the bias against exports that is usually a feature of trade 
protection" (p. 39).  This suggests that the governments maintained a rough neutrality of incentives between selling in 
the home and the foreign markets, i.e. despite intervention, there were "level playing fields" between different sectors of 
the economy and between internal and external markets.
8
  However as Scott (1991) rightly points out, this is simply an 
incorrect characterization of the commercial and industrial policies pursued in the East Asian economies.  Scott notes 
that the level playing fields between selling in the national and international markets prevailed in the U.S. and the U.K. 
economies which have been relatively unsuccessful in world competition.  Countries like Japan and Korea on the other 
hand, particularly during their periods of rapid growth, had a positive bias in favor of exports through the wide panoply 
of industrial policy instruments discussed above, including notably the use of performance criteria on exports and market 
share.  The Japanese and Korean corporations could only receive favored government treatment in terms of loans, 
foreign exchange allocations, etc., if they met such criteria.  Thus despite often low short-run financial returns on 
exports, they were obliged to fulfill their export targets. 
 To sum up the experience of Japan comprehensively contradicts the Report's central thesis that the more open the 
economy, the closer its integration with the global economy, the faster would be its rate of growth.  Although, for 
                                                 
    8Some neoclassical economists take this argument even further and suggest that the government intervention in the East Asian 
economies did no more than what the market would have done anyway, i.e. the government policy was simply simulating the market.  
There are serious analytical and empirical flaws in this market simulation thesis.  See Wade (1990). 
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reasons of space, the cases of the other East Asian countries [Taiwan and South Korea] have not been considered above, 
their stories, subject to certain modifications, also point in the same direction.
9
  If, as stated, the Report's central purpose 
was to find out why countries like Japan have been so successful in economic development during the last forty years, it 
has clearly been using the wrong paradigm for examining Japanese economic history.  The basic problem is that the 
underlying assumptions of this paradigm are greatly at variance with the real world of static and dynamic economies of 
scale, learning by doing, and imperfect competition.  In such a world, even neoclassical analysis now accepts that the 
optimal degree of openness for an economy is not "close" integration with the global economy through free trade.
10
  In 
that case, what is the optimal degree of openness for the economy?  This extremely important policy question however is 
not seriously addressed by orthodox theory.
11
 
 Chakravarty and Singh (1988) provide an alternative theoretical paradigm for considering this issue.  Very 
briefly, they argue that "openness" is a multi-dimensional concept; apart from trade, a country can be "open" or not so 
open with respect to financial and capital markets, in relation to technology, science, culture, education, inward and 
outward migration.  Moreover a country can choose to be open in some directions [say trade] but not so open in others 
such as foreign direct investment or financial markets.  Chakravarty and Singh's analysis suggests that there is no unique 
optimum form or degree of openness which holds true for all countries at all times.  A number of factors affect the 
desirable nature of openness:  the world configuration, the past history of the economy, its state of development, among 
others.  The timing and sequence of opening are also critical.  They point out that there may be serious irreversible 
losses if the wrong kind of openness is attempted or the timing and sequence are incorrect.  The East Asian experience of 
"strategic" rather than "close" integration with the world economy makes perfect sense within this kind of theoretical 
framework. 
 VI 
                                                 
    9For a detailed analysis, see Wade (1990); Amsden (1989). 
    10See for example Krugman (1987) and Roderick (1992). 
    11On this point, see the interesting review by Lucas (1990) of Helpman & Krugman (1989). 
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 Contrary to the Report's homilies about the virtues of "free mobility of capital and labor" and "free entry and exit 
of firms" and the importance of competition in the domestic markets, the  practice of the successful East Asian countries 
has been rather different.  As in relation to the question of integration with the world economy, these countries appear to 
have taken the view that from the dynamic perspective of promoting investment and technical change, the optimal degree 
of competition is not perfect or maximum competition.  The governments in these countries have therefore managed or 
guided competition in a purposeful manner:  it has both been encouraged, but notably also restricted in a number of 
ways. 
 In Japan, in the years immediately following the war, the Zaibaitsu were disbanded, and anti-trust laws of the 
U.S. type were enacted under the tutelage of the occupation authorities, however, over time these pro-competition 
measures were greatly diluted.  The government permitted or encouraged a variety of cartel arrangements in a wide 
range of industries--export and import cartels, cartels to combat depression or excessive competition, rationalization 
cartels, etc.  Table 3 provides information on cartels which were exempted during the period 1964 to 1973 from Japan's 
anti-monopoly laws.  According to Caves and UKEUSA (1976), cartels accounted for 78.1 percent of the value of 
shipments in textiles; 64.8 percent in clothing; 50.0 percent in non-ferrous metals; 47 percent in printing and publishing; 
41.2 percent in stone, clay and glass; 34.5 percent in steel products, and 37.2 percent in food products.  Caves and 
Ukeusa note that although these cartels varied in their effectiveness, "their mere presence in such broad stretches of the 
manufacturing sector attests to their importance." (p. 147). 
 More importantly, the Japanese government has regarded the anti-trust laws as a part and parcel of its overall 
industrial strategy.  As Magaziner and Hout (1980) point out, in young industries, during the developmental phase, the 
government discouraged competition in order to provide firms with a secure environment for profitable investment.  
When these industries became technologically mature, competition was allowed to flourish.  Later, when industries are 
in competitive decline, the government again discourages competition and attempts to bring about an orderly 
rationalization of the industry.  Magaziner and Hout observed that "MITI's greatest strength appears to be its 
understanding of the competitive stages through which an industry moves and its ability to fashion appropriate policy" (p. 
38). 
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Table 3.  Japanese Cartel Agreements Exempted from Antimonopoly Law by Fair Trade Commission or Competent Ministry, 
by Exempting Statute, 1964-73
a
 
{PRIVATE 
}Statutory basis 
for exemption 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Depression cartels 2 2 16 1 0 0 0 0 9 2 
Rationalization 
cartels 
14 14 14 13 13 12 10 13 10 10 
Export cartels 201 208 211 206 213 217 214 192 175 180 
Import cartels 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 
Cartels under 
Medium and Small 
Enterprises 
Organization Act 
 
 
588 
 
 
587 
 
 
652 
 
 
634 
 
 
582 
 
 
522 
 
 
469 
 
 
439 
 
 
604 
 
 
607 
Cartels under 
Environment 
Sanitation Act 
 
106 
 
122 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
 
123 
Cartels under 
Coastal Shipping 
Association Act 
 
15 
 
14 
 
16 
 
15 
 
22 
 
22 
 
22 
 
21 
 
19 
 
19 
Cartels under other 
statues 
43 50 44 44 47 48 56 53 34 42 
Total 970 999 1,079 1,040 1,003 948 898 844 976 985 
Source:  Japanese Fair Trade Commission, Staff Office, The Antimonopoly Act of Japan (1973), p. 27.   Reproduced from Caves & 
Uekusa (1976), p. 158. 
 
a
Number in force in March of each year. 
 
 Students of Japanese economy provide many examples of the above pattern from a number of different 
industries.  In steel, for example, Scott (1991) observes that during the expansion phase of the industry, individual 
companies were not allowed to build new plants except at world class scale.  This meant "spacing out investments to 
build large-scale plants without at the same time generating an excess capacity.  Japanese firms were required to wait 
their turn to build a new plant while a competitor built new capacity and achieved high volumes.  Next time the roles 
will be reversed.  This kind of coordination was carried out under the aegis of the  government─by MITI.  Later the 
system required the scrapping of old capacity as a condition for permission to build new.  As a result Japan with a 
smaller home market than the U.S. built ten plants larger than any in the U.S." (p. 54) 
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 Yamamura (1988) provides a useful model of Japanese industrial policy and the role of competition within it.  
The government essentially organized an "investment race" among large oligopolistic firms in which exports and world 
market share were significant performance goals.  As in the real world markets are always incomplete, such a race 
without a coordinator will lead to ruinous competition, price wars and excess capacity, inhibiting the inducement to 
invest.  In the Japanese economic miracle, MITI provided this crucial coordinating role (with the help of industry 
associations) and orchestrated the dynamic combination of collusion and competition which characterizes Japanese 
industrial policy.  "In a nutshell," Yamamura observes "what MITI did was to `guide' the firms to invest in such a way 
that each large firm in a market expanded its productive capacity roughly in proportion to its current market share─no 
firm was to make an investment so large that it would destabilize the market.  The policy was effective in encouraging 
competition for the market share (thus preserving the essential competitiveness of the industrial markets) while reducing 
the risk of losses due to excessive investment.  Thus it promoted the aggressive expansion of capacity necessary to 
increase productive efficiency in output" (p. 175). 
 VI.1 Again for reasons of space, I briefly note here that Korea also did not follow a policy of maximum domestic 
competition or unfettered market-determined entry and exit of firms.  The Korean government, if anything, went one 
step further than the Japanese in actively helping create large conglomerates, promoting mergers, and directing entry and 
exit of firms according to the requirements of technological scale economics and domestic and world demand conditions 
(see Table 1 in Section III).  It also helped organize the "investment race" among the Korean giant conglomerates along 
the Japanese lines.  It is sometimes argued that competitive market forces have played a relatively greater role in 
Taiwan's domestic economy, but I note that both Taiwan and South Korea possess some of the most highly concentrated 
industrial structures among market economy countries (see Table 4).
12
 
 VI.2  Turning to the factor markets, in Japan, both the domestic labor and capital markets have operated rather 
differently than envisaged in the Report's recipes for faster economic growth and successful development.  Although in 
South Korea and Taiwan, the labor market may have worked with "minimum labor laws," as the Report approvingly 
notes (p. 80), the situation in Japan has been quite different.  A large proportion of the labor force has effectively a 
                                                 
    12For different perspectives on the relative role of large and small firms in Taiwan's economic development.  See Scitovsky (1986) and 
Amsden (1985, 1989). 
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lifetime security of employment.  Many leading scholars of the Japanese economy ascribe the international competitive 
success and technical leadership of the Japanese corporations precisely to these "rigidities" in the labor market.  Security 
of employment encourages workers to undertake firm specific investments in human capital, to promote technical change 
rather than to thwart it (for the fear of being made redundant).  Not least, it also lets workers identify their interests with 
those of the corporation (see further Aoki, 1990; Dore, 1986, among others). 
 Similarly, in relation to the capital market, a growing number of scholars in the U.S. and the U.K. today believe 
that the Japanese economic success is also in part due to the fact that the Japanese industrial corporations have been 
spared, unlike their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, the tender mercies of a stock market and a freely functioning market for 
corporate control (see Dore, 1985; Odagiri and Hase, 1989; Cosh, Hughes, and Singh, 1990).  There are powerful 
analytical and empirical reasons for believing that the stock-market-based competitive financial systems are not  
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Table 4.  Percent Distribution of Manufacturing Value-Added
a
 by Firm Size, Selected Countries, 1973 
{PRIVATE }Number of Workers 
Country  1-9  10-99  100-499  500 or more 
Korea 5.8 13.8 27.7 52.7 
Taiwan
b
 4.4 16.7 22.5 56.4 
Hong Kong 7.4 30.2 32.1 30.2 
Brazil 3.4 23.7 36.1 36.6 
Turkey
c
 11.7 10.1 27.5 48.4 
Peru 4.0 23.9 46.4 25.7 
Japan
d
 8.7 28.4 24.9 37.9 
Canada
d
 2.0 21.1 37.4 39.3 
Czechoslovakia 0.2 5.4 18.2 76.11 
Austria 0.8 21.5 36.2 41.5 
United Kingdom 15.7
e
 24.4 60.0 
United States
d
 2.4 18.3 30.5 48.7 
Source:  All countries except Taiwan:  United Nations (1979).  Taiwan:  Executive Yuan, The Report of Industrial and 
Commercial Census of Taiwan and Fukien, District of the Republic of China, 1971, quoted in S. Ho (1980).  Reproduced 
from Amsden (1989). 
 
a
Generally, value-added in producers' values. 
b
Value-added in factor values, 1971. 
c
1970. 
d
Net value-added in factor values. 
e
1-99. 
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conducive to promoting industrial investment, technical progress and productivity growth.
13
  In none of the exemplar 
East Asian countries did a competitive capital market play a significant role in financing industrial growth.  As 
mentioned earlier, the bank Taiwan's leading banks continue to be under state ownership even today.  The Japanese 
financial system, during the period of the economic miracle (1950-73), although not under state ownership, was 
bank-based, oligopolistic and subject to considerable state direction. 
 In conclusion, I turn to the Report's argument that "[government] intervention in the market in East Asian 
economies was, in an overall sense, more moderate than in most other developing economies" (p. 39).  How does one 
quantify the extent of government intervention--for example the crucial coordinating role of MITI in Japanese industrial 
investment outlined above?  Such government support for the industry is much more significant than cash expenditure or 
subsidies.  Moreover, MITI's coordinating functions were not simply ones of completing the "incomplete" markets in the 
neoclassical sense.  Rather, it was a much broader role in the political economy of Japan, to help create a social and 
business consensus in favour of MITI's specific restructuring and developmental goals.  Thus, as Magaziner and Hout 
(1980) note:  "The process of discussion and debate between MITI and the companies in response to developments in the 
marketplace creates a dynamic decision making process.  MITI aptly refers to Japan as a `plan-oriented market 
economy'" (p. 39). 
 VII 
 Another central thesis of the Report is that domestic policy matters far more than international conditions in 
determining a country's economic performance.  This proposition ignores the far-reaching consequences of the 
historically unprecedented and massive external shocks which many Third World countries suffered at the end of the 
1970s and into the 1980s.  These shocks had a devastating effect on production, employment, inflation, as well as the 
political economy of these nations.  It will be suggested below that if rich countries like the U.K. and the U.S. had been 
subjected to international economic disturbances of a similar magnitude, they would most likely have fared worse and 
suffered a decade long-depression.  Although the Report recognises that during the last decade, the Latin American and 
                                                 
    13There is a large literature on the subject.  For the U.K., see Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1990), Singh (1992b).  For the U.S. see for 
example, MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (1990). 
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Sub-saharan African countries were subject to greater external shocks than the Asian countries, it does not adequately 
consider the differential impact of these shocks for respective economies on the three continents. 
 The above points are best illustrated by considering the case of Asian and Latin American economies.  Between 
1965 and 1980, the Latin American countries grew at much the same rate as the Asian countries--at about 5.5 percent per 
annum on average.  On the basis of the growth rate in that period, the two groups of countries could not be statistically 
distinguished.
14
  However, during the 1980s the Latin American growth rate collapsed to about 1.5 percent per annum 
while the Asian countries continued to grow at much the same rate as before (Singh, 1992a).  An important question, 
therefore, is what part of this reduction in Latin American growth was due to international forces and what due to 
domestic policy mismanagement and other internal factors.  A significant related issue is that if external economic 
shocks were largely responsible for the Latin American decline during the 1980s, how come the Asian countries 
continued to prosper in that decade? 
 The reasons for this differential economic performance of Asian and Latin American countries in the wake of the 
post 1979 world economic slow-down have been the subject of considerable controversy.  (See Balassa (1984), Sachs 
(1985), Maddison (1985), Singh (1986), Ros (1991), Hughes and Singh (1991), Fishlow (1991)).  In the present context, 
the treatment of this question will necessarily be brief. 
 A priori, there are three main factors which may help to explain the superior economic record of the Asian 
countries relative to those in Latin America:  (a) differences in economic structure and other initial conditions; (b) 
differences in the  economic policies pursued; (c) differences in the size of the economic shocks experienced by the 
countries on the two continents.  Balassa (1984) and Sachs (1985)--and the Report endorses their analysis--suggest that a 
very important reason for the better Asian economic performance is that these countries have more open and 
export-oriented economic structures, compared to those in Latin America.  Differences in economic and industrial 
structures between the Asian and Latin American economies have been examined in detail in Singh (1985) and Hughes 
and Singh (1991).  However, this analysis reveals very little evidence in support of the Balassa-Sachs openness 
                                                 
    14Unless otherwise indicated, the source of the figures cited in this section is Hughes and Singh (1991), which is based on a comparative 
analysis of the records of 10 Asian and 9 Latin American countries over the periods 1960-70, 1970-80, and 1980-85. 
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hypothesis.  The least open Asian economies like China and India, for example, were able to cope at least as effectively 
with the world economic crisis in the 1980s as the highly export-oriented Korean economy.
15
 
 Hughes and Singh (1991) and Singh (1986) argue that certain exogenous shocks emanating from the post-1979 
world economic crisis had a much greater impact on the economics of the Latin American countries than on the Asian 
economies.  First, it is suggested that the rise in interest rates had a far bigger effect on Latin American countries than on 
those in Asia since a larger proportion of the Latin American debt was of the floating rate variety.  Moreover, the Latin 
American countries were starting from much less favourable initial conditions.  In the period preceding the post-1979 
world crisis, i.e., during 1973 to 1979, the median debt service to exports ratio of the Latin American countries was more 
than twice as high as that of the Asian countries--22.9 percent compared with 10.7 percent. 
 Sachs (1985) suggests that with a few exceptions the impact of the rise in interest rates on the developing 
economies was not particularly significant.  He writes "at the peak the measured U.S. real interest rate rises by about 10 
percentage points and is multiplied by a debt/GDP ratio of the order of 20 percent, producing a peak annual loss of 2 
percent of GDP and an average annual loss of about 1 percent of GDP."  However, this is not a valid argument since as 
Hughes and Singh (1991) report, the median current account deficit in the Latin American countries was only about 3 
percent of GDP in the late 1970s.  The impact of the increase in interest rates (whether measured in nominal or real 
terms) on the current balance of these economies was therefore highly significant.  The dynamic consequences, 
(particularly in terms of capital flows) of an increase (or decrease) in the current account deficit by nearly a third for a 
balance of payments constrained economy, cannot be exaggerated. 
 Secondly, Hughes and Singh emphasise that the Latin American countries were far more subject to capital supply 
shocks than the Asian economies (on this point, see also the excellent detailed analysis of Fishlow (1991)).  To illustrate 
the nature of these shocks, consider the case of Mexico.  During the oil boom years, 1977 to 1981, the Mexican economy 
had been growing at a rate of 7 to 8 percent per annum with even the non-oil GDP rising at a roughly similar rate.  
However, despite the enormous increase in oil exports, the balance of payments position had been deteriorating.  The 
current account deficit rose from nearly 5 billion dollars in 1979 to almost 7 billion dollars in 1980 and to 11.7 billion 
dollars in 1981.  Notwithstanding this deterioration, the international banking community was happily willing to lend 
                                                 
    15There is a complex relationship between `openness' and the vulnerability of an economy to external shocks.  For a fuller analysis, see 
Hughes and Singh (1991). 
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Mexico ever increasing amounts to finance the deficits.  Thus from 1978 to 1981, while international bank loans to 
developing countries as a whole increased by 76 percent, they rose by 146 percent to Mexico, already a large debtor in 
1978.  To meet the Mexican government's increased demand for foreign loans to finance the current account deficit, the 
international banks accelerated their lending to Mexico in 1981, albeit with an increasing shortening of the term structure 
of the new loans (Ros, 1986).  In 1981, the capital account of the balance of payments indicate Mexico's net public short 
term liabilities rose by $12.7 billion (compared with $6 billion in 1980 and $1.7 billion in 1979).  However, in the crisis 
year of 1982, these capital flows were abruptly halted and the capital account shows that Mexico's net public external 
short term liabilities actually decreased by £614 million.  Brailovsky and Barker (1983) rightly note that this capital 
supply shock had a devastating effect on the Mexican economy. 
 Most of the other Latin American economies were subject to  similar capital supply shocks.  These emanated 
from what Williamson (1985) has named the "contagion effect" whereby, following the Mexican debt crisis in 1982, 
voluntary private capital flows to most Latin American countries were greatly reduced if not stopped altogether.  The 
important point is that because of the "contagion effect," capital flows were reduced much more to the Latin American 
than to the Asian economies.  This in turn will have worsened the balance of payments constraint in the Latin American 
countries more so and more suddenly than in the Asian countries. 
 Thirdly, Hughes and Singh (1991) that reduced world economic growth and world trade during 1980-82 had a 
differential impact on the normal export markets for countries in the two continents.  In particular, the Middle Eastern 
market, which was the most rapidly expanding market during this period, was much more significant for many of the 
Asian countries than for Latin America.  There are two important channels by which the Asian countries benefited from 
the economic prosperity in the Middle East:  (i) workers' remittances and (ii) the growth of merchandise exports. 
 Relative to the Asian countries it is argued that the above three factors together made the balance of payments 
constraint on the Latin American economies much more severe.
16
  It may be appreciated that a deterioration in the 
balance of payments position of the developing country has extremely serious consequences for all spheres of the 
                                                 
    16The terms of trade shock and the reduction in OECD economic activity in the 1980s had in general a larger impact on the Asian 
countries than on the Latin American countries.  However, Fishlow's analysis shows that if the interest rate and the capital supply shocks 
are also included, as a proportion of exports, the magnitude of external shocks suffered by the Latin American countries was on average 
much greater than that experienced by the East Asian countries.  Fishlow's sample did not include South Asian countries.  He also did not 
consider the effects of workers' remittances and the growth of the Middle Eastern markets. 
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economy, real as well as financial.  The effect on industrial production is direct and for many countries immediate.  The 
external payments constraint can become so binding that the country has to curtail not only the import of luxuries, or 
other consumer goods, but also the essential imports required for maintaining the existing level of domestic production.  
Agricultural production is affected both directly by the foreign exchange constraint and indirectly by reduced industrial  
production.  Reduced imports as well as lower domestic production of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs, together 
with lowered oil imports, hamper agriculture production directly.  Indirectly there is an unfavorable effect on production 
because of the reduced availability of the so-called incentive goods to farmers (soap, bicycles, etc.).  However, import 
compression not only threatens agricultural and industrial production but paradoxically also lowers exports.  Khan and 
Knight (1988) provide empirical evidence in support of this phenomenon. 
 Import strangulation and a balance of payments constraint also generate inflation and disequilibrium in 
government finances.  As in many developing countries, sales and excise taxes on industrial production as well as import 
duties are a major source of government revenue, the balance of payments constraint is directly and indirectly responsible 
for the enormous increases in budget deficits or the public sector borrowing requirements which these countries have 
been experiencing in the 1980s.  In the institutional circumstances of the heavily indebted Latin American economies, 
there is an important additional reason why such a constraint has generated a fiscal crisis.  This arises from the fact that 
after the debt crisis foreign debt has been consolidated in these countries to become largely the liability of the 
government and there is therefore a huge burden of interest payments on the budget.  Sachs (1987) provides data to show 
that in Argentina and Mexico, in the mid 1980s, interest payments represented nearly a third of the government's 
revenues. 
 As the government in many Latin American countries has a direct and major role in undertaking or financing 
industrial activity and investment, the fiscal crisis leads particularly to reduced industrial and infrastructural investment.  
A number of WIDER studies on macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries (see Taylor, 1988) have shown that 
in general, in the South, public investment `crowds in' rather than `crowds out' private sector investment.  This 
compounds the effects of the fiscal crisis on long term economic development. 
 In view of all the direct and indirect effects of the foreign exchange constraint and the balance of payments crisis 
brought about by world economic developments, it is not surprising to observe the poor industrial and overall economic 
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record of the Latin American countries during the last three decades relative to the Asian countries.
17
  There are, 
however, three other points which also deserve attention in this context. 
 First it should be observed that the external shocks which a wide range of developing countries suffered in the 
early 1980s were gigantic.  It requires an enormous economic and social effort as well as a considerable period of time to 
recover from the disruptions caused by such shocks.  To illustrate, the quantitative impact of the demand, the terms of 
trade, and the interest rate shocks on the balance of payments was estimated by the World Bank in 1985 for a small 
number of individual developing countries.  The combined average annual negative effect of these shocks during 
1981-82 amounted to 19.1 percent of GDP in Kenya, 14.3 percent in Tanzania, 18.9 percent in the Ivory Coast, 8.3 
percent in Brazil, and 29 percent in Jamaica.  Even excluding the capital supply shock, which for many countries was 
extremely significant, these estimates of losses suffered by the developing countries are huge.  To put these figures into 
perspective, it may be recalled that the impact of the adverse movements in the terms of trade for the U.K. (not then an oil 
exporter) as a result of the first oil shock in 1974-75, is estimated to have been equivalent to a reduction in GDP of about 
4 percent.  This led to an enormous redistributive conflict and to a near doubling of the rates of inflation and 
unemployment.  The government was obliged to undertake extraordinary measures (including for an advanced economy 
the rare step in 1976 of a recourse to the IMF) to restore economic stability.  Yet the developing economies, which are 
much poorer, have suffered in the early 1980s relatively far greater external shocks than the U.K. did in the mid 1970s. 
                                                 
    17For reasons of space the questions of misallocation of resources and macroeconomic mismanagement by the Latin American 
economies are not discussed above.  For an analysis of these issues, the reader is referred to Singh (1992b), Fishlow (1991), and Hughes 
and Singh (1991), where it is shown that the Latin American record was no worse in the former respect than that of the Asian countries.  
For example, contrary to the mainstream conventional wisdom, Fishlow's analysis of the consumption functions indicates that the Latin 
American countries did not use external borrowings to finance current consumption any more than the Asian countries did.  He notes:  
"At the margin, therefore, there was an expected substitution for domestic saving.  But there seems to be no difference in this respect 
between Indonesia and Korea, on the one hand, and Brazil and Mexico, on the other" (Fishlow, 1991, p. 153).  As far as the allocation of 
investment resources is concerned, with negative real interest rates, it was not just Mexico or Brazil but also South Korea which used 
foreign borrowings in the 1970s to launch an ambitious progamme of import substitution and development of heavy industries.  All these 
programmes ran into teething troubles of various kinds, but a major reason why the Korean programme nevertheless succeeded in the 
1980s whilst the Brazilian and the Mexican ones failed was because of the far more severe foreign exchange constraints which the latter two 
countries were subject to.  It is also important to remember in this context that, prior to the economic crisis of the last decade, Brazil's rate 
of growth of manufactured export (in value terms) during the 1970s was much the same as that of South Korea, while those of Mexico and 
Argentina were significantly higher than that of India. 
 Similarly, questions of macroeconomic policy errors, issues of "inappropriate" exchange rates and "capital flight" are also 
examined in the above contributions to challenge the orthodox views on these matters.  The capital flight, it is suggested, for example, was 
much more a consequence rather than a cause of the crisis in many of these countries.  The basic argument is that the external shocks led 
to economic and social disruption and financial instability in these economies in the way outlined in the text here.  This in turn was 
responsible for the capital flight.  Hughes and Singh argue that the adoption of policies to stem the capital flight was not a simple technical 
matter, but involved complex questions of the political economy of macroeconomic management in the affected countries. 
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 Secondly, apart from the huge task of adjustment to these shocks  at the beginning of the decade, it needs to be 
borne in mind that for many developing countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa, a number of the same 
adverse external factors continued to operate throughout the 1980s (Singh, 1992c).  
 Third, an essential part of my analysis here is that it is not the case that the Latin American countries were 
incompetent or unaware of the desirability of balanced budgets, etc., but that the economic shocks many of them suffered 
were so gigantic that their social and political institutions simply could not deal with the ensuing redistributive struggles 
over a diminished national cake.  Hence many of them experienced episodes of hyperinflation. 
 In view of the above, I find the Report's treatment of this subject--the impact of external shocks--for the 
developing countries to be very unsatisfactory.  I also find that the Report is led into a number of other analytical errors 
by not properly considering the effects of world economic conditions for national economic performance.  In view of 
these significant external shocks suffered by Latin American economies in the 1980s, it is not valid to aggregate their 
performance in that period with those of the 1960-1980 period, as it would produce misleading results.  Rather different 
rankings of economic performance of developing countries and hence very different conclusions with respect to 
'successful' economic policies emerge if the periods 1960-80 and 1980-90 are examined separately rather than together. 
 VIII 
 The last point above concerning incorrect aggregation bears on the Report's empirical analysis at several places 
(the reader may recall our earlier discussion in Section IV of the Report's evidence on the relationship between education 
and economic growth).  It is also directly relevant to the Report's examination of the rates of return on investment 
projects carried out by the Bank and by the IFC over the previous twenty years (1968-87).  The Report sets a great deal 
of store by the evidence presented on this issue (see Chapters 1 and 4; Table 4.2 and Figure 5). 
 This evidence purports to show that where the 'distortions' were low, the 'economic rates of return' (ERR) on 
these investment projects were considerably higher.  It is further argued that the greater the rate of return on investment 
projects, the greater will be  the overall economic growth.  Thus the Report:  "By every measure, ERRs are highest in 
undistorted markets, and lowest in distorted markets.  Projects implemented in an undistorted policy climate can have, 
on average, an ERR that is at least 5 percentage points higher than in a distorted climate [Table 4.2].  To put this finding 
another way, with a few exceptions, undistorted policies makes an investment at least one and a half times as productive.  
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The implication for growth is striking:  a difference in the ERR of 5 percentage points, if achieved across the economy, 
would translate into a difference in the annual rate of GDP growth per capita of more than 1 percentage point every year." 
[p. 82]. 
 There are two objections to this analysis.  First, the robustness of the results to the time periods and countries 
chosen.  For the reasons discussed above, because of the economic crisis in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
during the 1980s, the rates of return on projects in these two developing continents during the last decade will be low; 
aggregating all countries and time-period together will therefore lead to incorrect inferences.  The Report says that the 
results are robust with respect to industries and sectors, but it does not say anything about robustness with respect to 
time-periods and countries.  Secondly, and more importantly, the causation may well be the other way round.  The 
Report's causal chain is:  the lower the distortions in an economy, the larger the economic rate of return on its investment 
projects, the greater its economic growth.  The alternative Kaldorian causal model, mentioned earlier, is more plausible:  
the higher the rate of growth of aggregate demand in an economy, the greater its rate of economic growth and therefore 
the more productive the investment projects carried out in such  an economy.  Without an empirical analysis of such 
competing hypotheses, the Report's conclusion on this point cannot be accepted. 
 IX 
 As the main points of this paper were summarized at the start, it is not necessary to repeat them in this concluding 
section.  The central message of the paper is in fact contained in its title!  The chief lessons to be drawn from the 
experience of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan--countries which the Report holds up as models of successful development--is 
not some neutral, passive state with a "market friendly approach to development."  Nor did these nations seek or practice 
a deep and unconditional integration with the world economy during their periods of rapid growth. 
 Rather, the state in these economies played a vigorous role and followed a highly active industrial policy.  The 
government did not supplant the market altogether as the "command" planning of production of the soviet type did; nor 
did it simply follow the market.  Instead, in line with MITI's description of Japan as a "plan-oriented market economy," 
the government guided the market towards planned structural change.  Moreover the three East Asian countries 
integrated with the world economy in the directions and extent to which it was useful for them to do so. 
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 This paper has argued that in a world of imperfect competition, economies of scale and learning by doing, there 
are sound analytical grounds for following such policies to promote technical change and economic growth.  In such a 
world, the optimal degree of openness or the optimal degree of domestic competition for an economy is not maximum 
openness or perfect competition.  The Report seems to have been led into a misinterpretation of the East Asian 
experience because it is wedded to a theoretical paradigm whose assumptions do not correspond to the real world of 
manufacturing.  Its analysis and the lessons it purports to draw from the last forty years of development experience are 
not therefore helpful to developing countries. 
 It is important to emphasize that the present paper has mainly been concerned with the question of what are the 
correct analytical and policy conclusions which should be drawn from the historical experience of the `successful' and 
`unsuccessful' countries in the post-war period.  The important issue of whether the successful East Asian model can, or 
even should be replicated in other developing countries is a large subject which has not been examined here.  This must 
be left for another occasion. 
 In conclusion, I note that in a document which is supposed to reflect the synthesis and interpretation of the 
lessons of the last four decades of development experience by the World Bank's economists, there is a curious omission.  
There is very little explicit discussion of what lessons the Bank's economists draw from the Bretton Woods institutions' 
own important role in the developing countries' debt crisis during the last decade.  Normally, the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs), and implicitly the present Report, view their intervention in the debt crisis in a very positive light and 
regard their so-called case-by-case approach to adjustment as not only being correct but also successful.  However, from 
the point of view of the developing countries, the role of these institutions is seen rather differently, as essentially being 
that of a debt collector for the private western banks.  In the bargaining between creditors and debtors during the last 
decade, the IMF is thought to have been a powerful influence on the side of these banks with the result that the burden of 
adjustment has been one-sidedly borne by the debtor countries rather than being equitably shared with the banks and 
other parties.  The case-by-case approach has involved the extraordinary spectacle of all the creditor banks banding 
together, de facto under the IMF auspices, and confronting each debtor country separately.  It is notable that the Bretton 
Woods Institutions discouraged the  formation of debtors' cartels as a response to this situation. 
 The adjustment process in the debtor countries since 1982 can be regarded as successful only from the standpoint 
of the banks but not from that of the countries themselves.  The debtor countries have certainly been able to achieve 
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massive trade surpluses and a large turn-round in their current account balance, but this "success" has been obtained at 
enormous cost in terms of capacity utilisation, unemployment, low economic growth, reduction in real wages and rise in 
inflation.  Instead of a normal flow of capital from the rich to the poor countries, the world has witnessed a reverse flow 
from South to North, amounting on average in the Latin American countries to as much as 4 percent of their GDP for 
several years in the mid and late 1980s. 
 The significant analytical questions about the BWI's role in the debt crisis are the following:  has the 
BWI-inspired adjustment process been economically efficient from the point of view of either the debtor countries or that 
of the world economy?  Would, for example, the losses to output and employment have been lower if the BWIs had 
acted differently?  It is a pity that the Report does not address these issues, not least in order to draw appropriate lessons 
for the future. 
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